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CASENOTES AND COMMENTS
ATTACHMENT - PUBLIC INSTITUTION AS
GARNISHEE. HUGHES V. SVBODA'
While the defendant-appellee, Svboda, was serving a
term in the Maryland House of Correction, plaintiff-appel-
lant, Hughes, instituted in the Circuit Court for Anne
Arundel County non-resident attachment proceedings
against Svboda for an alleged claim of $775. The writ of
attachment was served upon the superintendent of the
House of Correction, and that institution was summoned as
garnishee. At the time of his incarceration Svboda had on
his person cash amounting to $426.25 which was taken by
the warden, of which amount, prior to laying the attach-
ment, Svboda had spent a small sum. As to the remainder,
the Board of Welfare, through the Attorney General of the
state, confessed assets. The motion of Svboda, defendant, to
quash the attachment was granted, and an appeal was taken
from such action. The Court did not discuss appellee's con-
tentions that he had been a resident of Maryland for some
months prior to sentence, that he was amenable to suit in
the Circuit Court of Anne Arundel County at the time the
attachment was issued, and that the writ of summon issued
could readily have been served upon him. The Court af-
firmed the order upon the principle that a public officer or
public institution is not subject to garnishment. In refer-
ence to the confession of assets, it was held the superintend-
ent had received the funds in question by virtue of his office,
and, since the laws of the State were not intended to give
authority to lay attachments in the hands of public officials
or institutions, it necessarily follows that their operation
is not suspended by a confession of assets. The appellee's
rights must be determined by the law of the State, and not
by the pleasure of its subordinates.
Although the statute2 prescribes in effect that an attach-
ment may be laid in the plaintiff's own hands or in the hands
of "any other person", it has long been held in this juris-
diction that, notwithstanding the apparent broad scope of
this phrase, it does not include within its purview a gov-
ernmental or a municipal corporation; the rule being that
such bodies corporate are by reason and necessity excluded
unless specifically named8. It was said in Wilson v. Ridge-
ly4 that "great public inconvenience would arise if money
'168 Md. 440, 178 Atl. 108 (1935).
Md. Code, Art. 9, Sec. 29.
'Baltimore v. Root, 8 Md. 95, 63 Am. Dec. 692 (1855); Gomborov on
Attachment, 24 et seq.
"46 Md. 235, 248 (1877), quoting with approval from Bulkley v. Eckert,
3 Barr (Pa.) 368 (1846).
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could be thus arrested in the hands of officers, and they be
made liable to all the delay, embarrassment and trouble that
would ensue from being stopped in the routine of their bus-
iness, compelled to appear in court, employ counsel and an-
swer interrogatories, as well as take care that the proceed-
ings are regularly carried on." The holding in Baltimore
v. Root,5 to the effect that salaries due public officials are
exempt from attachment was expressed as a more general
principle in Wilson v. Ridgely6 to the effect that an attach-
ment cannot be maintained which has been levied upon any
funds held by a person as a public officer. The principle
was stated again in Dale v. Brumbly7 concerning funds in
the hands of a Clerk of a court.' Robertson v. Beall9 is ob-
viously distinguishable. In that case, funds in the hands
of an ex-sheriff, consisting of fees due to and collected by
him for an ex-register of wills were held liable to attach-
ment; both parties being out of office at the time the attach-
ment issued, they stood in the same relation to each other
as any other creditors and debtors. Their terms of office
having expired, there was nothing in public policy which in-
terdicted the levying of the attachment."
The general rule is stated in Corpus Juris:" "the ex-
emption of a State from being made garnishee extends to
its officers and agents. The same rule applies to federal of-
cers and agents."
An interesting holding was arrived at in the Tennessee
case of Dickens v. Bransford Realty., wherein an attach-
ment sought to reach funds held by a railroad operating
under the supervision of the Director General of Railroads.
Deciding that garnishment would not lie, the Court stated:
"While it is true that Public Act No. 107 of the Sixty-Fifth
Congress very broadly authorized suits against such com-
mon carriers, still their liability to suit is not greater than
that of the various municipal corporations of this state.
Such liability, however, should be confined to their own
creditors. Since it is the settled policy of this State to hold
immune from garnishments all municipalities and other
5 Supra, note 3.
'Supra, note 4.
798 Md. 468, 56 Atl. 807, 64 L. R. A. 112 (1904).
6 As this purports to deal solely with the position of a public institution
as garnishee, the question of funds in custodia legis will not be discussed
herein. For an interesting case on this latter problem, see Horsey Co. v.
Martin, 142 Md. 52, 120 Atl. 235 (1923).
' 10 Md. 125 (1856).
10 See also L. R. A. 1917-F, 1119.
1128 C. J. 61, Garnishment, Sec. 74.
21 141 Tenn. 387, 210 S. W. 644 (1918).
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governmental agencies, we think such protection must be
accorded to defendant .. "
The salary of an instructor in a Los Angeles public school
was held not subject to garnishment, in Weiser v. Payne."
However Smith v. City of Mobile, 5 from Alabama, held a
city firemen's compensation subject to garnishment, since
the fireman was an employee of the city, and his $75 per
month compensation was " salary" and not " wages " with-
in the statute authorizing garnishment of money due city
employees as salary. 6 This case is an instance of the trend
of legislative policy reflected by statutes making express
provision, by garnishment or closely analogous remedies,
for the subjection of the compensation of public officers and
employees to the claims of their creditors. 7 This is, of
course, in strong contrast to the policy of the courts, as ex-
emplified by Baltimore v. Root' s or by the recent Georgia
case of Haverty Loan and Savings Co. v. McAfee,1' hold-
ing that a municipal employee's creditor having an assign-
ment of salary, could not enjoin the municipality from pay-
ing to the employee the salary due him, again speaking of
public policy exempting municipalities from garnishment of
wages due a municipal employee.2" Numerous courts are
in accord with Baltimore v. Root in holding that a garnish-
ment statute making corporations liable to garnishee pro-
cess does not apply to municipal corporations, 21 although a
respectable minority 2 of jurisdictions has held otherwise.
The attitude of the courts and the extent to which they
sometimes go in interpreting statutes is illustrated by Owen
v. Terrell.2" A New Mexico statute provided in effect that
in all cases where the plaintiff has a judgment in some court
of the state against the defendant any public officer may be
summoned as garnishee. The court held that there was no
express or implied intent by the act in question to subject
the salary of a public officer to garnishment. "So far as the
act itself appears, the Legislature may have only intended
to extend the process of garnishment to public officers in
23 Ibid., 141 Tenn. 391.
1 110 Cal. App. 378, 294 Pac. 407 (1930), followed by Lay v. Hammond,
212 Cal. 665, 300 Pac. 10 (1931).
15 230 Ala. 584, 162 So. 361 (1935).
16 Alabama Code, 1928, Sees. 8088, 8090.
1" 28 C. J. 181, Garnishment, Sec. 219.
1 Supra, note 3.
'8 179 Ga. 673, 177 S. E. 241 (1934).
10 See also Shepherd v. Jones, 228 Ala. 307, 153 So. 223 (1934).
21 Ann. Cas. 1913-B, 746, 56 A. L. R. 602 et seq.
12 Bray v. Wallingford, 20 Conn. 416 (1850); Wilson v. Lewis, 10 R. 1.
285 (1872).
28 22 N. M. 373, 162 Pac. 171 (1916).
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cases where such officers had come into possession of prop-
erty or money of the judgment debtor by virtue of the of-
fice or otherwise, as in the case of money deposited with
officers, or where funds or property were in custodia legis.
It is not for this court to broaden the terms of this act, or
by construction read into the act an intention which does
not clearly appear." The following year the Legislature
expressed its intent unambiguously24 and extended the right
to garnishee funds in the hands of the state and its sub-
divisions to salaries due public officers. This statute was
applied to the salary of a district attorney in Stockard v.
Hamilton.25
Several decisions have been rendered on the question of
the constitutionality of such statutes. It has been broadly
stated that statutes authorizing the garnishment of the sal-
ary or the wages of public officials or employees are within
the legislative power.26 A statute permitting the garnish-
ment of the wages of municipal and county employees, which
does not extend to those of the state, does not conffict with a
constitutional provision against class legislation, Cavender
v. Hewitt.27  An Illinois statute,28 was held unconstitu-
tional as class legislation as it did not apply to all municipal
corporations of the state.2 9
DIFFICULTY OF OBTAINING APPELLATE RUL-
INGS ON SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW-
CORROBORATION OF ACCOMPLICES-
FOLB V. STATE'
One of two defendants convicted by a judge without ajury of "operating a gaming table"I appealed from the con-
viction alleging as grounds of error, first, that the "slot
machines" in question were not sufficiently proven to con-
stitute "gaming tables" under the statute, and, second, that
the testimony of an accomplice was erroneously admitted
without corroboration. Held: Conviction affirmed. The
legal sufficiency of the evidence to prove that the slot ma-
chines were gaming tables may not be considered on appeal,
24 New Mexico Statutes Annotated, Ch. 59, Sec. 59 127 (1929).
25 25 N. M. 240, 180 Pac. 294 (1919).
26Dunkley v. McCarthy, 157 Mich. 339, 122 N. W. 126, 17 Ann. Cas. 523
(1909); note, 22 A. L. R. 760.
2"145 Tenn. 471, 239 S. W. 767, 22 A. L. R. 755 (1922).
28 Illinois Laws, 1905, p. 285.
" Badenock v. City of Chicago, 222 Ill. 71, 78 N. E. 31 (1906).
1169 Md. 209, 181 Atl. 225 (sub. nom. Ruthenberg et al. v. State) (1935).
